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David F. Schmitz, Thank God They 're on Our Side: The United States and 
Right- Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
Pop quiz time. Name those responsible for the following quotes: (1) 
"There is no doubt that a very definite struggle is going on between the violent 
radical wing of the Nazi Party . . . and what may be termed the more moderate 
section of the party, headed by Hitler himself . . . which appeal[s] to all 
civilized and reasonable people." (2) "BraziI's democratic development has 
probably been strengthened in the long run" by the 1964 military coup d'etat; 
and (3) The U.S. "devotion to the principles of democracy is a historical fact." 
Time's up. Score 100 if you answered (1) George Gordon, American chargC 
d'affairs in Berlin, 1933, (2) the CIA, April 1, 1964, and (3) the U.S. State 
Department, March 1964. 
In the long historical debate over American exceptionalism, one issue 
seems beyond question. While other great powers over the centuries have 
claimed their foreign interventions and maneuvers to be a product of national 
interest, realpolitik, or (in the case of the British), the advancement of 
"civilization," U.S. leaders have consistently suggested that their policy 
initiatives reflected a moral decision to promote democracy and democratic 
principles abroad. Such an insistence on the part of policymakers has produced 
a rather fantastic discourse in which even the most obnoxious dictators (from 
Hitler and Mussolini to Somoza and Pinochet) are transformed into 
"moderates" who will - immediately or ultimately - promote the course of 
democratic development. 
David Schmitz's book casts an extremely useful spotlight on the long-term 
U.S. practice of supporting whatever foreign leader can best further its policy 
aims and the discursive dilemmas this creates when dictators are packaged as 
democrats de jour. The book is particularly valuable in the context of the post- 
Cold War reexamination of U.S. foreign policy and its recent military 
interventions into the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. The Kosovo policy, above 
all, tended to depict in the public mind the picture of a national policy driven 
solely by humanitarian and altruistic desires. While Congress debated whether 
the United States should be the global purveyor of democracy, few voices were 
raised to question whether U.S. policy had other, more self-interested, aims in 
mind. Schmitz's examination of the U.S. support for right-wing dictators 
between 1921 and 1965 is a needed antidote to the triumphalist clang of the 
late 1990s. 
Latin Americanists will be familiar with most of Schmitz's targets: U.S. 
support for the "depression dictators" in Central America (including the 
vicious and likely unbalanced General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez in El 
Salvador and Anastasio Somoza Garcia in Nicaragua), Colonel Carlos Castillo 
Armas in Guatemala, or General Humberto Castello Branco in Brazil in the 
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1950s and 1960s respectively. It is instructive, then, to place the Latin 
American case materials in the broader context of U.S. policy toward European 
(Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Salazar) and Southeast Asian (Diem) dictatorships. 
General Francisco Franco's transformation from enemy to ally in the context 
of the U.S. desire to "stabilize" Europe in the post-war period is particularly 
instructive in this regard. 
The obverse of Schmitz's argument is also beneficial. If U.S. policymakers 
have long supported dictators in the name of democracy, they have also 
overthrown or opposed democrats and nationalists who would not yield to U.S. 
demands. Plutarco Elias Calles, perhaps the most conservative Mexican 
president in the 1920s, was nonetheless described by the State Department as 
a "much redder bolshevist than Lenin ever was" (50) when he attempted to 
develop an independent Mexican policy toward Central America. When the 
United States moved against the democratically elected government of Jacobo 
Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
torturously argued that "to eradicate these Communist groups [i.e. Arbenz] is 
not an interference, but an elimination of the interference" (196). Similar 
arguments have been launched against JoPo Goulart in Brazil, Salvador 
Allende in Chile, and others. 
If it is a relatively straightforward, but worthwhile, task to demonstrate the 
bankruptcy of the official U.S. insistence that its foreign policy is a 
fundamentally moral one, underwritten solely by a desire to sponsor 
democratic development in the world, it is a more difficult assignment to parse 
out those factors which have inspired policy. This is particularly important for 
Latin America, an area of the world that the United States has long held in 
special regard. In this light, while Schmitz's global analytic approach is often 
an advantage, it can also disrupt what must be seen as the exceptional 
characteristics of Latin America as an historic sphere of influence for the 
United States. This point is suggested by Under Secretary of State Robert Olds 
who opposed Mexican leaders in the 1920s for attempting to "set aside our 
special relationship in Central America" (50). Schmitz more often argues that 
U.S. policy was diiven by the policymakers' fear of instability andlor 
communism. Without entering into a chicken-and-egg argument, one should 
recognize the elements of U.S. policy that separate Europe from Latin 
America. 
U.S. policymakers' recourse to racist arguments to support their policy 
initiatives in Latin America, convincingly rehearsed in Michael Hunt's 
Ideology and US. Foreign Policy (1987) remains breathtaking not just for its 
persistence but for the fact that certain explanations characteristic of 
nineteenth century sociology remained embedded in U.S. discourse well into 
the present century. President Coolidge's ambassador to Mexico ascribed the 
obstacles in U.S.-Mexican relations to ' l . .  . an Indian . . . hatred of all people not 
on the reservation," adding "there is very little white blood in the Cabinet." 
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(49-50) In a statement which recalls Thomas Carlyle's 1848 attack on the 
former slaves of the Caribbean as lazy freeloaders, the U.S. military attache in 
El Salvador argued shortly before an explosion of peasant unrest in 1932 that 
the United States need not worry about the poor in that country since they "can 
always get fruit and vegetables" (62). Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
professing in 1949 that he was rather "vague" about the "situation in South 
America" nonetheless suggested that their "problems" stemmed from the 
"Hispano-Indian culture - or lack of it" (149). And Thomas Mann, perhaps the 
most influential Latin American policymaker in the 1960s, bragged, "I know 
my Latinos. They understand only two things - a buck in the pocket and a kick 
in the ass" (182). The sheer doggedness of racist explanation forces us to 
examine the roots of Latin American policy in a different light than German 
policy, for example. 
The nature of the "threat" which U.S. policymakers have perceived in 
Latin America from the time of John Adams to the present has changed over 
the decades, but not the feeling of "threat" itself. Nineteenth-century "bandits" 
gave way to twentieth-century "anarchists," "reds" or, currently, "drug- 
traffickers." (John Foster Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in 1954 that "in the old days we used to be able to let South America go 
through the wringer of bad times.. .but the trouble is that now, when you put it 
through the wringer, it comes out red" [195]). At the bottom there remains the 
argument - best summed up in Monroe's 1823 state of the union address and 
best understood by examining the various drafts of Monroe's speech as 
presented to the British - that the United States has long seen Latin America 
as its own sphere of influence. U.S. policy will support governments that 
operate in a framework acceptable to Washington (democratic or dictatorial), 
and oppose governments that operate in a framework unacceptable to 
Washington (democratic or dictatorial). Thus, those moments which, in 
Schmitz's analysis, fall outside the general thrust of U.S. policy (Truman's 
efforts to oust Perbn or Franco, or Kennedy's support for democratic regimes 
in 1961-62), are ultimately not an obstacle to his overall analysis: none of the 
governments explored during those short periods actually challenged 
hndamental aspects of U.S. policy in either Latin America or Europe. Indeed, 
Schmitz summarizes the point quite neatly when referring to Truman's policy 
toward Vietnam: the United States would prefer to see stable, independent and 
democratic governments throughout the world . . . but where such governments 
stood in the way of U.S. interests, democracy would give way to a 
straightforward pursuit of "national" interests. 
A few errors or omissions impair this otherwise highly readable and 
valuable study. JosC Santos Zelaya's regime ended in 1909, not in the "1920s" 
(156). The U.S. role in the assassinations of Rafael Trujillo and Ngo Dinh 
Diem, as disclosed by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, should have been reviewed. 
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Yet Schmitz's conclusion calls attention to one important consequence of the 
consistent U.S. attempt to use "moral arguments and appeals to gain public 
support" (308) for its foreign initiatives. By opening the discourse of U.S. 
foreign policy to moral argumentation, this policy remains subject and 
vulnerable, itself, to moral judgment. 
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Stephen G.  Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John E Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
Without the Soviet Union as an alternative model, Latin American nations 
increasingly imitate the United States. But "Tio Sam" frequently sends mixed 
messages regarding public policy toward Central and South America. During the 
Cold War, U.S. decisions proved particularly difficult to decipher. President John 
F. Kennedy's interrupted administration especially defied easy analysis. In the 
book, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, Stephen G. Rabe argues that 
President Kennedy's Latin American relations generated conservative, even 
reactionary, forces. In dealing with these nations, Kennedy may have allowed 
anticommunist fervour to ovemde promotion of democracy, constitutionalism, 
capitalism, and social justice. 
Although U.S. resistance to communism initially prompted Kennedy to 
advocate reform in Latin America, fear of instability inspired ultimate acceptance 
of military or dictatorial rule. The young president asserted leadership in a global 
struggle against communist regimes. When several Latin American dictators lost 
power in the late 1950s, Kennedy encouraged democratic capitalism for these new 
governments. The young president promoted a balance of free-market principles 
with progressive taxation and moderate government regulation. Kennedy believed 
that this "New Deal9'-style approach would bring social justice, legitimate and 
stable regimes, and resistance to communist appeals and insurrections. Excessive 
apprehension about short-term instability, however, ultimately motivated 
Kennedy's Latin America policy. According to Rabe, Kennedy favoured pro- 
United States dictatorial and military governments rather than leftist democratic 
regimes. Socialist leaders who refused to denounce communism never inspired 
the confidence of U.S. officials. If the United States could not guarantee a Latin 
American leader's anticommunist credentials, therefore, Kennedy favoured order 
rather than democracy, constitutionalism, and decolonization. 
In Rabe's interpretation, Kennedy's support for military rulers and 
counterinsurgency doctrines left a reactionary legacy. To avoid disorder and 
communist revolution, Kennedy tolerated authoritarian regimes in the Dominican 
